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Abstract  
The corporate offensive was the main driving force in the neoliberal transformation of 
Mexico as it was in the United States and Canada.  But in Mexico the corporate power 
bloc had to change the political order to achieve its hegemonic aspirations and desired 
policy changes. While the top bourgeoisie have been able to achieve more direct 
control of the state, they have not been able to establish a stable system of 
domination. The rise of bourgeois hegemony in Mexico is fragile. But the working class 
has not yet been able to find its voice and break free of the bonds of Mexico’s old state‐
linked unions or state system of labour repression in general. However, the on‐going 
hardships imposed by neoliberalism, the fragile legitimacy of the new political regime, 
and the surviving popular traditions of revolutionary struggle point to a renewal of a 
class‐based popular fight‐back sooner rather than later. 
 
Résumé 
L’offensive du patronat a été la force prépondérante derrière la transformation 
néolibérale du Mexique, comme aux Etats‐Unis et au Canada. Mais, au Mexique, le bloc 
du pouvoir patronal était obligé de transformer l’ordre politique afin de réaliser ses 
aspirations hégémoniques et la transformations politiques souhaitées. Alors que la 
haute bourgeoisie a réussi à renforcer son contrôle direct sur l’état, elle n’a pas réussi à 
établir un système stable de domination. L’ascendance de l’hégémonie bourgeoise au 
Mexique est fragile. Mais, la classe ouvrière n’a pas encore réussi à trouver sa voix et à 
briser les chaines des anciens syndicats liés à l’état mexicain ou le système étatique de 
répression du travail en général. Néanmoins, les difficultés de longue durée imposée 
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par le néolibéralisme, la légitimité fragile du nouveau régime politique et les traditions 
populaires de lutte révolutionnaire qui persistent, suggère la renaissance d’une contre‐
attaque populaire basée sur les classes, plus tôt et non plus tard. 
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The Rise of Bourgeois Hegemony 
 
The	Old	Regime	and	the	Bourgeoisie	
Mexico’s	one‐party	presidentialist	system,	the	major	role	of	the	state	in	the	
economy,	and	the	rhetoric	of	“revolutionary	nationalism”	obscured	the	
tremendous	power	that	business	had	in	the	old	regime	as	well	as	its	role	in	
bringing	about	the	neoliberal	regime	and	competitive	elections.	Though	
there	were	important	differences	between	the	various	Mexican	
presidential	regimes	of	the	PRI	(Partido	Revolucionario	Institucional	/	
Institutional	Revolutionary	Party)	in	its	70+	years	of	rule,	a	constant	was	
the	pursuit	of	national	capitalist	development.	The	Mexican	Revolution	of	
1910‐1920	produced	a	regime	that	combined	elements	of	Bonapartism	
with	elements	of	corporatism.	Though	limited	to	one	term	after	1928,	the	
President	ruled	over	a	system	based	on	the	corporatist	control	of	the	
popular	classes	incorporated	into	a	state	party	system.	The	ruling	political	
elites	based	their	power	on	the	contained	and	compartmentalized	
mobilization	of	popular	forces	that	could	offset	the	power	of	the	domestic	
oligarchy	as	well	as	foreign	capital	and	government.	The	popular	support	
and	legitimacy	of	the	revolutionary	regime	rested	on	the	promise	and	
practice	of	major	concessions	while	these	concessions,	in	turn,	gave	
credibility	to	the	legitimating	ideology.	The	extent	and	the	character	of	
these	concessions	varied	from	president	to	president,	reaching	their	most	
radical	peak	in	the	presidency	of	Lázaro	Cárdenas	(1934‐1940)	when	
major	land	redistribution	was	carried	out,	the	foreign	owned	oil	industry	
was	nationalized,	and	worker	and	peasant	organization	was	promoted.	
However	the	goal	of	national	capitalist	development	remained	primary	
throughout	all	these	presidencies.		
There	was	a	wide	spectrum	of	views	within	the	political	elite	as	to	
the	right	mix	between	social	justice	and	capitalist	development	but,	in	
general,	there	was	a	shared	belief	that	a	national	capitalist	route	of	
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development	was	the	only	viable	path.	Even	those	who	were	socialists,	
with	few	exceptions,	felt	that	Mexico	had	to	develop	through	capitalism.	
But	there	was	also	the	widely	shared	belief	that	the	excesses	of	capitalism	
could	be	contained	by	an	actively	interventionist	state,	that	a	balance	
between	different	class	interests	could	be	maintained	for	the	sake	of	the	
broader	national	interest.	Capitalist	development	also	provided	
opportunities	for	members	of	the	political	elite	to	advance	their	private	
interests	and	to	become	capitalists	themselves.	
Beyond	opposition	to	specific	governmental	policies,	the	big	fear	of	
business	was	that	the	great	degree	of	state	autonomy,	the	revolutionary	
rhetoric	of	the	regime,	and	the	demands	of	workers	and	peasants	could,	as	
it	at	times	did,	lead	to	major	attacks	against	specific	capitalist	interests	or	
the	interests	of	capital	as	a	whole.	Big	business	was	kept	distant	from	
governmental	power	at	the	same	time	that	governmental	policies	generally	
favoured	the	interests	of	big	business.	Sections	of	big	business,	especially	
the	northern	business	elite	centred	in	Monterrey,	persistently	and	bitterly	
opposed	the	strong,	relatively	autonomous	state	but	cooperated	with	it	in	
their	quest	for	riches.	
Although	Big	Business	was	kept	away	from	direct	political	power,	it	
nevertheless	had	significant	power	based	on	its	wealth	and	control	of	key	
sectors	of	the	economy.	Capitalists,	acting	individually	or	in	a	coordinated	
manner,	have	powerful	economic	levers	that	any	government	has	to	take	
into	account	in	shaping	policy.	Capital	flight,	the	withholding	of	investment,	
the	relocation	of	plants,	are	all	potent	weapons	that	can	impose	powerful	
constraints	or	penalties	on	a	government	and	on	its	ability	to	carry	out	its	
programs,	or	even	survive.		
But	the	use	of	this	capitalist	class	power	was	constrained	by	
divisions	within	the	capitalist	class	and	by	the	willingness	of	the	political	
elite	to	come	down	fiercely	on	open	criticism	of	the	regime.	Thus,	while	the	
political	elite	was	constrained	by	the	nature	of	its	goal	of	capitalist	
development	as	well	as	the	strength	of	some	sectors	of	capital,	it	also	had	
important	leverage	that	it	could	use	against	individual	capitalists	or	sectors	
of	capital.	As	well	as	imposing	costs	and	obstacles	on	difficult	companies,	it	
could	and	did	even	expropriate	some	businesses.	The	use	of	these	levers	
against	individual	capitalists	would	not	only	give	a	strong	message	to	other	
capitalists	but	these	occasional	attacks	on	“selfish”	capitalists	could	
contribute	to	the	legitimation	of	the	regime	as	a	“revolutionary	nationalist”	
one.	Popular	sectors	could	be	mobilized	as	part	of	this	disciplining	and	
legitimating	process.	As	well,	the	state	actively	sought	to	keep	the	business	
class	divided,	a	policy	it	also	carried	out	among	the	popular	sectors.	
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The	power	of	Big	Business	grew	along	with	its	economic	power	
during	the	Mexican	miracle	(1940‐1970).	But	this	expansionary	phase	of	
Mexico’s	ISI	(Import	Substitution	Industrialization)	period	provided	
significant	profits	for	most	sectors	of	Mexican	capital	and	limited	the	more	
extreme	anti‐regime	views	within	the	capitalist	class	to	a	minority.	The	
expanded	power	of	business	would	combine	with	a	series	of	economic	and	
political	crisis	to	transform	the	balance	of	forces	within	the	Mexican	
bourgeoisie.	
	
The	Transition:	The	Struggle	for	Hegemony		
The	growing	tensions	between	the	political	elites	and	the	Mexican	
bourgeoisie	would	come	to	a	head	during	the	presidencies	of	Luis	
Echeverría	(1970‐1976)	and	José	Lopez	Portillo	(1976‐1982)	as	the	regime	
tried	to	deal	with	various	political	and	economic	crises	in	ways	that	deeply	
disturbed	business.	When	Luis	Echeverría,	who	had	been	Secretary	of	
Government	(Interior)	when	the	student	massacre	of	1968	took	place,	
became	President	in	1970,	he	sought	to	regain	both	his	legitimacy	and	that	
of	the	regime	by	a	political	liberalization	and	populist	policies	of	wage	
increases	and	state‐directed	economic	development.	The	government	
feared	that	the	militancy	of	the	urban‐popular	protest	of	the	late	'60's	
would	spread	to	the	working	class.	These	changes	in	the	regime’s	strategy	
–	as	well	as	the	rise	of	worker	struggles	–	disrupted	the	fragile	equilibrium	
between	the	state	elite,	big	national	capital,	and	the	multinationals	that	had	
developed	during	the	period	of	desarrollo	estabilizador	(stabilized	growth	
model).	Key	business	groups	resented	the	plan	to	withdraw	subsidies	and	
to	have	more	efficient	tax	collection.	They	felt	threatened	by	the	rise	of	
workers	militancy	that	showed	prospects	of	spilling	beyond	the	terrain	of	
narrowly	economic	interests.	
The	sharp	rise	in	business	discontent	in	response	to	Echeverría’s	
flirtation	with	populism	and	the	growth	of	labour	militancy	in	the	early	
1970’s,	led	to	the	formation	of	the	CCE	(Consejo	Coordinador	Empresarial	/	
Business	Coordinating	Council),	the	umbrella	organization	of	business	that	
sought	to	bring	together	the	varied	and	often	discordant	voices	of	business.	
The	key	force	in	the	formation	of	the	CCE	was	the	CMHN	(Cámara	Mexicana	
de	Hombres	de	Negocios	/	Mexican	Businessmen’s	Council).	The	CMHN	had	
been	formed	in	1962	by	twelve	of	the	most	powerful	businessmen	in	
Mexico	who	sought	to	strengthen	business	influence	by	forming	this	highly	
exclusive	and	secretive	organization	with	the	goal	of	discretely	lobbying	
and	pressuring	the	government.	The	CMHN,	which	now	has	36	members,	
remains	the	most	powerful	business	group	in	Mexico.	It	has	provided	most	
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of	the	funding	for	the	CCE	and	many	of	the	CCE’s	presidents	came	from	the	
small	group	of	members	of	the	CMHN	(Cypher	and	Delgado	Wise	2010;	
Puga	2004;	Schneider	2002).	Open	business	criticism	of	government	policy	
grew	in	the	‘70s	but	remained	limited	to	criticisms	of	policy,	never	
extending	to	the	legitimacy	of	the	regime.	
The	power	of	business	was	strengthened	by	the	financial	and	
economic	crisis	of	1976	which	forced	Mexico	to	go	to	the	IMF	for	help.	The	
leverage	of	the	IMF	strengthened	the	hands	of	big	business	and	their	allies	
within	the	government.	Thus,	the	conservative	forces	in	Mexican	society,	
with	the	aid	of	international	capital	and	the	IMF,	were	able	to	defeat	the	
populist	flirtation	of	Echeverría.	
The	new	government	of	President	José	Lopez	Portillo	(1976‐1982)	
sought	to	restore	business	confidence	and	reassure	the	IMF.	Business‐state	
relations	warmed	when	López	Portillo	made	conciliatory	gestures	to	
business	in	the	first	years	of	his	presidency.	The	moderate	forces	in	
business	were	strengthened	and	business	retreated	from	direct	policy	
criticism.	Based	on	the	hoped‐for	revenues	from	the	discovery	of	vast	new	
oil	reserves,	the	government	borrowed	massively	to	finance	its	“alliance	
for	profits,”	a	policy	of	promoting	and	subsidizing	profits.	While	the	
government’s	spending	spree	greatly	enriched	the	wealthy	and	powerful,	it	
sowed	the	seeds	of	Mexico’s	financial	crisis.	Mexico’s	debt	crisis	both	
saddled	the	Mexican	people	with	astronomical	public	indebtedness	and	
increased	the	leverage	of	foreign	capital.	
Mexico’s	economic	crisis	peaked	towards	the	end	of	Lopez	Portillo’s	
presidency	as	the	country	faced	massive	capital	flight,	the	possible	
bankruptcy	of	the	state,	and	the	financial	panic	of	August	1982.	This	crisis	
not	only	threatened	the	Mexican	state	but	also	the	interests	of	the	foreign	
creditors	of	Mexico’s	banks.	The	President	responded	by	nationalizing	the	
banks	(Marois	2008;	Cypher	1990,	120‐121).	The	nationalization	of	the	
banks	by	Lopez	Portillo	in	1982	led	to	a	new	political	direction	for	
business.	The	bank	nationalization,	carried	out	to	protect	foreign	creditors	
of	Mexican	banks,	showed	both	the	increased	leverage	of	US	capital	and	the	
IMF	and	the	tremendous	autonomous	power	of	the	state	to	act	against	the	
most	powerful	sections	of	Mexican	capital.	The	nationalization	was	
accompanied	by	populist‐nationalist	rhetoric	and	elicited	a	tremendous	
popular	response.	Business	as	a	class	felt	threatened.		The	strategies	of	the	
more	radical	wings	of	business	gained	strength.	A	consensus	was	emerging	
that	the	regime	itself	had	to	be	challenged.	“Business	now	had	a	longer	
time	horizon	and	its	goals	were	more	political	and	less	narrowly	
instrumental”	(Thacker	2000,	107).	Business	now	had	hegemonic	
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aspirations	though,	of	course,	there	were	still	important	policy	divisions	
within	business	on	the	role	of	the	state	in	the	economy	and	on	free	trade.	
The	most	powerful	sectors	of	business	were	for	a	diminished	economic	
role	of	the	state,	the	destruction	of	unions,	and	an	opening	of	the	economy	
to	foreign	capital.	These	sections	would	be	strengthened	by	the	massive	
privatization	of	the	1980s	and	1990s	and	would	be	joined	by	powerful	new	
sectors	created	by	these	very	privatization	projects.	At	the	same	time,	
those	business	sectors	tied	to	the	domestic	market,	state	subsidies,	and	
state	protection	from	external	competition,	would	be	severely	weakened.	
López	Portillo’s	nationalization	of	the	banks	occurred	at	the	very	
tail	end	of	his	presidency.	The	incoming	President,	Miguel	de	la	Madrid,	
was	not	even	consulted.	The	presidency	of	de	la	Madrid	can	be	seen	as	a	
transitional	presidency	to	the	neoliberal	triumph.	He	first	sought	to	restore	
business	confidence	while	maintaining	the	preeminent	role	of	the	state	in	
guiding	the	economy.	But	Business	was	not	satisfied	with	this	approach	
and	fought	hard	during	the	early	years	of	his	presidency	to	shift	policy	and	
power	more	to	the	neoliberal	right,	to	change	tripartite	consultations	
(business,	unions	and	the	state)	to	bipartite	(business	and	the	state)	and	to	
insulate	the	government	from	populist	temptations.	President	de	la	Madrid	
carried	out	measures	that	greatly	strengthened	the	power	of	Big	Business	
and	affected	the	internal	make‐up	of	the	business	class.	“Many	of	the	new	
owners	of	these	privatized	firms	came	from	‘the	ranks	of	new	private	
financiers	that	rose	to	power	during	the	financially	volatile	1980s’	
(Heredia	quoted	in	Thatcher	2000,	116)	and	the	acquisition	of	these	
companies	fortified	the	development	of	the	new,	independent,	financially	
connected	entrepreneurial	class”	(Thacker	2000,	116).	The	wealth	and	
power	of	business	increased	as	did	the	concentration	of	capital	in	Mexican	
society	and	within	the	business	class.	
An	important	opponent	of	the	neoliberal	assault	on	the	state	sector	
was	the	political‐economic	elite	of	the	state	whose	significant	privileges	
and	power	were	based	on	their	commanding	positions	in	state	enterprise	
as	well	as	their	simultaneous	or	sequential	roles	in	the	ruling	party	
bureaucracy	or	government.	Their	state‐based	positions	required	the	
continuation	of	a	powerful	state	economic	sector.	The	ideology	of	
“revolutionary	nationalism”	and	the	directing	role	of	the	state	within	a	
capitalist	economy	fit	their	interests	well.	As	well,	the	“charros”	sitting	atop	
the	large	unions	in	the	public	sector,	who	were	also	intertwined	with	the	
ruling	party	and	the	state,	shared	the	ideology	and	interests	of	the	state	
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elite	in	a	strong	public	economic	sector.1	And	workers	in	this	sector	often	
had	better	jobs	and	benefits	than	those	in	the	private	sector.	As	well,	
important	sections	of	small	and	middle‐sized	capital	depended	on	state	
support	and	took	a	positive	position	towards	the	government’s	role	in	the	
economy,	at	least	until	the	late	1960s.	
The	debate	within	the	government	and	ruling	party	over	economic	
policy	was	rooted	in	rival	hegemonic	projects	as	well	as	in	different	models	
of	capitalism,	models	which	had	more	or	less	congruency	with	these	rival	
projects.	The	hegemony	of	the	old	“revolutionary	nationalist”	historic	bloc	
had	to	be	destroyed	for	the	triumph	of	the	neoliberal	historical	bloc.	The	
top	Mexican	capitalists,	in	alliance	with	their	foreign	allies,	moved	to	
implement	a	neoliberal	agenda	of	an	export‐oriented	and	open	economy	
and	a	state	that	would	eliminate	the	social	wage	while	increasing	its	
coercive	power.	But	along	with	a	different	economic	direction,	the	new	
power	bloc	–	with	powerful	help	from	the	private	owners	of	the	major	
media	–	promoted	an	economic‐cultural	model	that	sought	to	
institutionalize	a	culture	of	possessive	individualism	and	destroy	the	
remnants	of	Mexico’s	communalist	cultures	that	had	been	given	a	reprieve	
by	the	Mexican	Revolution	and	subsequent	decades	of	revolutionary	
nationalist	hegemony.	
Massive	privatization	destroyed	the	power	base	of	key	sectors	of	
the	state	elite	while	creating	great	wealth	and	power	for	new	and	old	
sectors	of	capital.	Some	of	the	elites	and	bureaucrats	of	state	enterprises	
were	able	to	find	soft	landings	by	transferring	their	skills	and	energies	to	
the	private	sector.	Others	experienced	downward	mobility.	Some	of	the	
charros	were	able	to	keep	control	of	their	reduced	membership	and	have	
sought	to	sell	their	services	of	labour	control	to	the	new	private	owners.	
But	very	few	workers	in	the	public	transportation	and	industrial	sectors	
have	found	soft	landings.	The	massive	elimination	of	public	companies,	the	
degradation	of	working	conditions	and	the	collective	agreements	at	those	
companies	that	were	privatized,	the	failure	to	produce	new	jobs	in	the	
regions	where	state	enterprises	had	been	located,	have	all	contributed	to	
the	hard	landing	of	most	of	the	former	workers	in	the	state	transportation	
                                                 
1  The  term  “charro”  refers  to  officials  of  state‐linked,  corrupt, undemocratic  unions. While 
once  an  integral  part  of  the  ruling  party  in  the  one‐party  regime,  they  now  can  best  be 
described as regime‐linked, working with whichever of the two neoliberal parties are in power 
in particular states and nationally, and trying to manoeuvre within the rivalry between these 
parties to better leverage their bargaining power in terms of preserving their control of their 
unions. 
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and	industrial	sectors.	It	is	the	residues	of	this	old	historic	bloc,	both	its	
elite	members	and	its	mass	base,	that	continue	to	provide	major	support	
for	the	revival	of	the	modernized	“revolutionary	nationalism”	of	Andrés	
Manuel	López	Obrador	or	for	the	return	of	the	PRI	to	the	presidency,	
wishfully	hoping	that	it	would	mean	the	return	of	at	least	some	aspects	of	
the	economic	benefits	of	the	old	regime.	
	
The	New	Regime:	Bourgeois	Domination	without	the	Consolidation	of	a	
Hegemonic	Historic	Bloc	
The	increasingly	direct	political	role	of	sections	of	business,	mostly	
through	the	right‐wing	PAN	(Partido	Acción	Nacional	/	National	Action	
Party),	led	the	PRI	to	seek	to	give	business	a	more	direct	presence	in	the	
PRI	and	in	the	state	apparatus.	The	PRI	began	to	run	business	candidates	
against	the	PANs	business	candidates,	more	business	people	were	
recruited	to	work	within	the	state,	the	more	pro‐business	departments	of	
the	state	gained	power	over	the	more	traditionally	nationalist	departments	
of	the	state.	The	transformation	of	the	state	from	a	Bonapartist	capitalist	
state	towards	more	direct	capitalist	domination	(as	in	the	US	and	Canada,	
though	still	in	the	political	form	of	a	one‐party	regime)	was	well	underway	
in	the	1980s	and	would	be	intensified	in	the	1990s.	In	2000,	the	first	
victory	of	an	opposition	presidential	candidate,	the	former	President	of	
Coca‐Cola	Mexico,	Vicente	Fox	of	the	PAN,	over	the	ruling	party’s	candidate	
was	a	milestone	in	the	legitimation	and	triumph	of	the	power	of	Big	
Business,	albeit	in	the	guise	of	a	“democratic	transition.”	President	Fox	
(2000‐2006)	described	his	government	as	a	"government	of	
entrepreneurs,	by	entrepreneurs	and	for	entrepreneurs”	(La	Prensa,	
Panama,	21	June	2001).	This	transition	to	electoral	competitiveness	at	the	
presidential	level	was	a	defeat	for	the	ruling	party	and	opened	up	a	new	
political	scene	of	constrained	party	competition	in	Mexico.	The	very	real	
electoral	space	and	democratic	dynamics	that	were	opened	up	were	
subordinated	to	the	dynamic	of	the	rise	of	more	direct	capitalist	rule	and	
increased	repression	by	the	state	and	private	forces.	The	concentration	of	
wealth	and	power	through	privatization	and	other	government	policies	
intensified	bourgeois	domination	and	both	constrained	and	hollowed	out	
the	processes	of	democratization.	When	the	tendencies	to	democratization	
challenge	the	boundaries	of	capitalist	power,	democratization	is	sacrificed	
for	“stability.”	
The	corporate	offensive	was	the	main	driving	force	in	the	neoliberal	
transformation	of	Mexico	as	it	was	in	the	US	and	Canada.	But	in	Mexico	the	
corporate	power	bloc	had	to	change	the	political	order	and	aspects	of	the	
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political	culture	in	order	to	achieve	its	hegemonic	aspirations	and	bring	
about	its	desired	policy	changes.	It	was	joined	in	these	goals	by	sections	of	
the	political	elite	who	had	moved	away	from	Keynesian	and	statist	ideas	
and	by	the	influence	and	pressures	from	international	actors	promoting	
neoliberalism	and	free	trade.	The	growth	of	the	influence	of	neoliberal	
economics	and	its	impact	on	Mexican	government	technocrats	studying	in	
the	US	as	well	as	the	leverage	asserted	by	the	IMF	and	US	during	various	
Mexican	crisis	moments	was,	of	course,	crucial	in	leading	to	the	triumph	of	
the	neoliberal	corporate	offensive	already	underway	in	Mexico.	But	it	is	
mistaken	to	see	Mexico’s	turn	to	neoliberalism	and	free	trade	as	simply	a	
result	of	these	external	factors.	This	dependency	explanation	obscures	the	
struggle	for	hegemony	within	the	Mexican	capitalist	class	and	of	that	class	
over	Mexican	society.	The	structural	and	instrumental	power	of	capital	
acting	through	its	different	fractions	and	varying	combinations	of	exit	and	
voice	strategies	(Hirschman	1970)	at	different	times	has	been	decisive.	The	
restiveness	of	Mexican	capital	under	Bonapartist	capitalist	development	
changed	into	hegemonic	aspirations.	The	Mexican	capitalist	class	had	to	
transform	the	relationship	between	capital	and	the	state	in	order	to	
achieve	its	policy	goals.	As	described	above,	the	political	elite	that	
controlled	the	state	had	a	great	deal	more	autonomy	than	did	the	political	
elites	of	the	US	and	Canada.	The	domestic	bourgeoisie	had	much	less	
structural	or	political	power	over	state	elites	in	Mexico.	The	
interpenetration	of	the	capitalist	class	with	the	state	was	much	more	
limited	in	Mexico	than	in	the	rest	of	North	America	until	recent	decades.	
The	ideology	of	the	regime	was	“revolutionary	nationalism,”	an	ideology	
that	posited	the	leading	role	of	the	state	not	only	in	economic	development	
but	also	in	maintaining	an	equilibrium	between	capital	and	labour.	The	big	
bourgeoisie	was	kept	outside	the	official	party	in	the	one	party	state	
though	labour	and	peasant	organizations	composed	two	of	the	three	
official	sectors.	The	fractious	ideological	conflicts	and	differences	in	
sectional‐economic	interests	within	the	capitalist	class	were	utilized	as	
part	of	the	government’s	strategy	for	keeping	the	Mexican	bourgeoisie	in	
its	place	in	the	economic	sphere	and	outside	politics.	Business	could	not	
completely	overcome	its	internal	divisions	over	ideology,	strategy	and	
tactics	or	different	policy	interests	(especially	over	trade	and	protection)	
but	over	time,	a	dominant	if	not	completely	ideologically	hegemonic	
fraction	developed,	aided	by	government	economic	policies	and	
favouritism	in	the	process	of	privatization.	But	Big	Business	had	also	to	
fight	for	the	legitimacy	of	business	playing	any	political	role	whatsoever.	
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The	eventual	success	of	peak	business	leadership	in	achieving	
dominance	within	business	and	the	state	was	made	possible	not	only	by	
their	own	efforts	but	by	a	variety	of	internal	and	international	political	and	
economic	developments	(Concheiro	Bórquez	1996).	The	big	bourgeoisie	
and	sections	of	the	state	have	succeeded	in	imposing	a	neoliberal	model	of	
development,	an	increasing	fusion	and	open	partnership	of	Big	Business	
and	the	state,	and	the	transformation	of	the	role	of	the	state	from	that	of	
fostering	some	degree	of	equilibrium	between	capital	and	labour	to	
fostering	the	complete	domination	of	big	business	over	labour.	
While	Big	Business	has	been	able	to	reshape	the	state	and	public	
policy,	it	has	not	achieved	ideological	hegemony	over	the	overwhelming	
majority	of	the	popular	classes	for	two	main	reasons.	First	of	all,	Big	
Business	and	the	rival	political	party	elites	have	been	unable	to	develop	an	
electoral	process	that	could	legitimate	the	political	regime.	The	unexpected	
emergence	of	a	third	electoral	force,	populist	and	nationalist,	in	the	1988	
presidential	election,	in	the	candidacy	of	Cuauhtemoc	Cárdenas	through	
the	National	Democratic	Front	(FDN),	later	to	become	the	PRD	(Partido	de	
la	Revolución	Democrática	/	Party	of	the	Democratic	Revolution),	disrupted	
the	hopes	of	the	bourgeoisie	and	political	elites	for	the	establishment	of	
electoral	alternation	between	the	right‐wing	business	party,	the	PAN,	and	
the	old	state‐party,	the	PRI,	now	neoliberal.	Cárdenas	won	the	elections	but	
the	PRI	fraudulently	stole	them	leading	to	massive	protests.	And	once	
again,	in	the	presidential	elections	of	2006,	the	party	of	the	right,	the	party	
of	alternation,	the	PAN	stole	the	presidential	elections	from	Andres	Manuel	
López	Obrador	and	the	PRD,	again	leading	to	massive	protests	and	
disruptions	in	Congress	during	the	inauguration	ceremonies.	Though	
electoral	hopes	persist	among	broad	sectors	of	the	population,	the	frauds	
of	1988	and	2006,	one	by	each	of	the	major	parties	linger	in	popular	
memory.	The	smell	of	fraud	that	existed	during	one‐party	rule	has	now	
continued	in	the	so‐called	“democratic	transition.”	The	corrupt,	one‐party	
authoritarian	presidentialist	regime	has	been	replaced	by	a	corrupt,	multi‐
party	authoritarian	political	system.	
Secondly,	the	regime’s	neoliberal	policies	have	been	devastating	to	
the	lives	of	the	popular	classes	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.	
These	neoliberal	policies	have	produced	wide‐scale	and	persistent,	albeit	
fragmented,	resistance	from	social,	community,	and	indigenous	
movements	throughout	Mexico.	The	struggles	of	the	popular	social	
movements	have	deepened	and	widened	the	awareness	of	the	linkages	
between	neoliberalism	and	the	hollowed	out	“democratic	transition.”	The	
“democratic	transition”	has	come	packaged	with	a	devastating	attack	on	
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the	lives	of	ordinary	people.	The	combination	of	the	continuing	fraudulent	
electoral	processes,	the	relentless	devastation	of	living	standards,	and	
persistent	popular	protests	have	produced	an	increasingly	militarized	
repressive	state	and	sullen,	but	potentially	explosive	discontent.				
	
The Neoliberal Offensive  
	
Massive	Privatization	and	Union	Busting	
In	order	to	achieve	this	gigantic	transfer	of	wealth	from	some	hands	to	
others,	the	Mexican	oligarchy	and	the	transnational	power	groups	carried	
out	diverse	political	and	financial	operations	to	destroy	the	formerly	
powerful	public	sector	of	the	economy,	a	sector	that	controlled	many	of	the	
strategic	branches,	at	the	same	time	subordinating	workers	in	all	the	
spaces	in	dispute.	Mexico’s	privatization	program	was	one	of	the	largest	in	
the	world.	The	number	of	state‐owned	enterprises	decreased	from	1155	in	
1982	to	210	in	2003.	The	most	important	and	profitable	enterprises	were	
sold	at	bargain‐basement	prices	to	powerful	Mexican	capitalists	and/or	
politically	well‐connected	people.	Some	of	the	important	companies	that	
were	privatized	were	the	national	telephone	company	(Telmex),	the	
national	airline	(Mexicana	de	Aviación),	a	national	TV	network	(Televisión	
Azteca),	several	major	steel	plants	(Siderúrgica	Lázaro	Cárdenas	and	Altos	
Hornos	de	México),	a	major	ship‐builder	(Astilleros	Unidos	de	Veracruz),	
the	national	railway	(Ferrocarriles	Nacionales	de	México)	and	many	other	
companies.	Article	27	of	the	Constitution	was	amended	in	1992	to	facilitate	
the	break‐up	of	ejidos	(communally	owned	rural	lands)	as	well	as	to	grant	
mining	companies	longer	and	more	generous	rights	to	subsoil	wealth.	The	
mineral	rights	were	transferred	mainly	to	three	Mexican	companies:	
Peñoles,	de	Alberto	Bailleres;	Grupo	México,	de	Jorge	y	Germán	Larrea;	y	
Carso,	de	Carlos	Slim	(who	also	received	Telmex	and	is	now,	according	to	
Forbes,	the	richest	man	in	the	world)	(López	Obrador	2010,	21‐34).	
Each	privatization	process	produced	a	major	conflict	with	the	
workers.	The	privatizations	in	the	mining‐metallurgical	sector	have	
resulted	in	a	chronic	conflict	between	the	leading	companies	and	the	
miners’	union,	over	the	continuing	validity	of	the	collective	agreement.	In	
the	transport	sector,	the	privatization	of	the	railways	and	of	the	airlines	
continues	to	produce	vicious	attacks	against	union	dissidents.	The	most	
recent	case,	the	privatization	of	the	electricity	sector	was	only	possible	
through	the	destruction	of	the	union	with	the	deepest	roots	and	most	
democratic	tradition	in	the	country,	the	Mexican	power	workers	union	
(SME;	Roman	and	Velasco	2009).	Perhaps	the	only	exception	in	which	
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privatization	was	not	accompanied	by	a	major	conflict	was	in	the	case	of	
Teléfonos	de	México,	where	the	partnership	approach	of	union	and	
company	allowed	the	union	to	“associate”	itself	in	a	dependent	manner	
with	the	new	owner,	Carlos	Slim.	
The	state	policy	of	transferring	public	assets	into	private	hands	was	
accompanied	by	a	fierce	attempt	to	restore	managerial	control	on	the	shop	
floor	through	various	tactics	from	outsourcing,	job	flexibility	and	
deregulation	of	labour	relations	on	a	constantly	widening	scale.	The	
temporary	or	permanent	closure	of	workplaces	“contaminated”	by	trade	
union	resistance,	the	dismantling	of	collective	agreements,	unilateral	
changes	to	labour	law	through	case	law	issued	by	an	increasingly	
conservative	Supreme	Court,	and	severe	restrictions	of	the	right	to	strike,	
the	use	of	terror	and	intimidation	to	keep	control	in	maquiladora	cities	of	
the	North,	have	together	and	separately	contributed	to	the	cancellation	of	
labour	rights	in	many	sectors	of	the	economy,	and	even	whole	regions	of	
the	country,	rights	that	Mexican	workers	had	struggled	to	win	in	the	
ascendant	phase	of	the	Mexican	Revolution.	
	
The	Attack	on	Wages	
The	consequences	of	neoliberalism	for	Mexican	workers	have	been	
devastating.	Real	salaries	have	fallen	dramatically	from	1980	to	2010	in	
spite	of	great	growth	in	productivity.	The	real	value	of	the	minimum	wage	
declined	by	70	percent	from	1980	to	2010,	the	average	of	contracted	
wages	in	federal	jurisdiction	by	over	50	percent,	that	of	manufacturing	by	
20	percent.	If	we	use	pre‐crisis	(2007)	figures,	there’s	no	change	in	the	first	
two	categories	but	average	manufacturing	wages	had	only	fallen	by	15	
percent;	they	fell	an	additional	9	points	between	2009	and	2010	(See	table	
1).	According	to	official	government	sources,	44.2	percent	of	the	
population	lived	in	poverty	in	2008,	over	47	million	people	(Consejo	
Nacional	de	Evaluación	de	la	Política	de	Desarrollo	Social	n.d.).	This	figure	
has	increased	since	the	crisis	of	2008	as	jobs	have	been	lost,	more	people	
forced	into	the	lower‐waged	informal	sector,	and	remittances	from	the	US	
sharply	reduced.	The	number	of	people	in	poverty	in	2010	“had	grown	to	
53	million,	according	to	a	study	by	the	Monterrey	Institute	of	Technology”	
(cited	by	Mexican	Labour	News	and	Analysis,	January	2010).	
We	estimate	that	the	share	of	the	wages	of	production	workers	and	
nonsupervisory	employees	in	the	GDP	declined	from	35	percent	in	1982	to	
23	percent	in	2009.	This	is	consistent	with	the	data	on	the	evolution	of	the	
real	minimum	wage,	of	the	average	real	contract	wage	among	workers	
covered	by	federal	jurisdiction	and	average	wages	in	the	manufacturing	
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industry,	according	to	the	statistics	presented	in	the	Fourth	Government	
Report	by	the	Federal	Executive	of	Mexico	(Poder	Ejecutivo	Federal	2010,	
189;	see	Table	1).	
	
Table	1	
Evolution	of	Real	Salaries	in	Mexico	in	the	Period	1980	to	2010	
														(1980	equals	100	percent)	
	 	 Minimum	
Wage	 	 Average	Contractual	Wage	in	Branches	under	Federal	Jurisdiction	 Average	Wages	in	Manufacturing	Industry	
		 		 		 		 		
1980	 	 100.00	 	 100.00 100.00	
1985	 	 68.13	 	 78.39 96.56	
1990	 	 49.30	 	 63.63 78.39	
1991	 	 46.53	 	 64.32 83.04	
1992	 	 41.85	 	 62.37 90.13	
1993	 	 42.10	 	 62.35 85.14	
1994	 	 41.66	 	 61.37 88.64	
1995	 	 35.11	 	 51.05 77.26	
1996	 	 36.05	 	 45.97 69.92	
1997	 	 31.80	 	 45.54 69.46	
1998	 	 34.56	 	 46.24 71.47	
1999	 	 31.32	 	 46.20 72.49	
2000	 	 31.51	 	 47.43 76.81	
2001	 	 32.03	 	 48.65 81.88	
2002	 	 32.06	 	 49.01 83.41	
2003	 	 32.14	 	 49.10 84.51	
2004	 	 31.44	 	 48.84 84.70	
2005	 	 31.79	 	 49.02 84.06	
2006	 	 31.52	 	 49.25 84.73	
2007	 	 31.41	 	 49.43 85.33	
2008	 	 30.23	 	 49.04 86.43	
2009	 	 30.53	 	 48.62 86.27	
2010	 	 30.32	 	 46.83 79.50	
Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2010.	
	
We	can	get	a	better	handle	on	the	significance	of	this	fall	of	the	
share	of	wages	in	the	GDP	of	Mexico	if	we	put	it	in	comparative	context	in	
terms	of	the	cost	of	living	and	real	purchasing	power	parities	in	the	
economies	of	various	countries.	The	relative	level	of	wages	in	Mexico	has	
been	steadily	declining	in	the	last	quarter	century.	The	report	by	the	Union	
Banks	of	Switzerland,	Price	and	Earnings	around	the	Globe	(Union	Banks	of	
Switzerland	2009,	9)	shows	that	wages	in	Mexico	City	are	among	the	
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lowest	of	the	60	most	important	cities	in	the	world.	In	2009,	average	wages	
in	Mexico	City	were	fifteen	times	lower	than	the	New	York	City,	eleven	
times	lower	than	those	of	Chicago,	eight	times	less	than	those	of	Montreal,	
four	times	less	than	Seoul,	three	times	less	than	Sao	Paulo	and	two	times	
less	than	those	of	Santiago	de	Chile.	This	report	shows	that	the	view	that	
the	People's	Republic	of	China	has	lower	wages	than	Mexico	is	false.	The	
salaries	of	Shanghai	or	Beijing	were	more	than	double	that	of	Mexico	City	
in	2009.	
This	situation	has	deteriorated	further	in	recent	decades.	It	was	not	
just	a	result	of	the	economic	disasters	of	the	eighties.	Since	1994,	the	
relative	situation	of	wages	in	Mexico	has	deteriorated,	even	in	the	period	of	
alleged	fiscal	responsibility	and	equilibrium.	In	1994,	according	to	the	
same	report,	Price	and	Earnings	around	the	Globe,	Mexican	wages	were	
much	closer	to	the	main	cities	of	the	world.	Wages	in	New	York	and	
Chicago	were	just	five	times	higher	than	Mexico	City;	those	of	Montreal	
were	slightly	more	than	four	times	that	of	Mexico	City.	In	almost	all	cases	
the	distance	was	half	of	what	it	is	now.	Wages	in	Seoul	were	only	two	times	
higher	than	Mexico	City	and	those	of	Sao	Paulo,	Brazil	were	even	below	
those	of	Mexico	City.	The	problem	of	low	wages	is	the	central	source	of	
poverty	in	Mexico,	as	the	official	unemployment	rate	is	only	6.2	percent.	In	
Mexico,	the	vast	majority	of	people	are	poor	because	they	receive	low	
wages,	not	because	they’re	not	working.		
	
The	Attack	on	Unions		
There	have	been	great	ebbs	and	flows	in	union	membership	in	Mexico	over	
the	last	century	in	relation	to	the	level	of	class	struggle	and	the	policies	of	
the	government.	The	Revolution	produced	powerful	institutional	
mechanisms	that	gave	great	power	to	the	government	to	facilitate	or	
obstruct	union	formation.	These	powers,	based	on	article	123	of	the	
Constitution	of	1917	and	implemented	in	subsequent	labour	legislation	
allowed	the	government	to	declare	strikes	legitimate	or	illegitimate	as	well	
as	to	grant	or	deny	union	recognition.	Unions	had	to	walk	a	difficult	
tightrope	between	independence	and	currying	the	favour	of	the	ruling	
party	to	survive.	As	unions,	especially	their	leadership,	became	integrated	
into	the	ruling	party	when	it	was	formed	in	the	late	1930s,	it	provided	
them	a	means	of	influencing	government	labour	policy	and	a	powerful	
push	towards	becoming	part	of	the	state	system	of	labour	control.	As	the	
government’s	policies	turned	more	to	the	right	in	the	1940s	and	beyond,	
union	officialdom	became	a	more	and	more	privileged	state‐linked	
disciplining	oligarchy	over	its	own	members.	There	have	been	and	
	Socialist	Studies	/	Études	socialistes		7(1/2)	Spring/Fall	2011:	238‐258	
	
252 
continue	to	be	bitter	struggles	between	rank	and	file	members	and	their	
official	leaders,	charros,	over	control	of	unions.	Further,	the	decadence	of	
this	stratum	of	charros	has	extended	to	the	sale	of	protection	contracts	and	
the	creation	of	phantom	unions,	“unions”	in	name	only,	selling	contracts	to	
management	to	prevent	the	formation	of	real	unions	and	often	not	even	
known	to	their	own	members.	Further,	many	of	the	unions	in	the	industrial	
region	around	Monterrey,	Nuevo	León,	are	white	or	company	unions	set	up	
by	the	region’s	extremely	right‐wing	capitalists	to	keep	out	real	or	charro	
unions.	There	are,	then,	two	sets	of	“unions”	that	are	not	unions,	the	
phantom	and	the	white	unions.	Charro	unions	have	a	greater	heterogeneity	
and	their	union‐like	character	will	vary	by	union	and	period,	depending	on	
rank	and	file	pressures,	political	considerations	of	the	charro	leaderships,	
and	relationship	to	management.	Some	engage	in	real	bargaining	for	their	
members,	others	are	completely	in	bed	with	management.	This	fictional	
and	semi‐fictional	character	of	most	Mexican	unions	makes	it	necessary	to	
approach	union	density	figures	in	Mexico	with	great	caution.	
Nevertheless,	it’s	clear	that	there	has	been	a	real	decline	in	union	
membership	in	the	last	decades,	The	Commission	for	Labour	Cooperation	
of	NAFTA	has	shown	that	the	rate	of	unionization	in	Mexico	declined	by	25	
percent	from	the	end	of	the	1980s	to	2003,	when	it	became	less	than	15	
percent	(North	American	Agreement	on	Labour	Cooperation	(NAALC)	
2003,	25).	The	crisis	of	the	public	sector	and	the	reclassification	of	more	
and	more	workers	as	employees	of	confidence	not	eligible	for	union	
membership	had	a	big	impact	on	union	membership.	The	recent	recession	
has	also	taken	a	toll	on	union	membership.	According	to	the	official	
statistics	of	the	Commission	for	Labour	Cooperation,	scarcely	4	million	
workers	out	of	an	economically	active	population	of	43	million	are	
members	of	unions.	If	you	were	to	peel	away	the	completely	fictional	
unions	(phantom	unions),	those	with	protection	contracts,	the	number	of	
union	members	would	be	greatly	reduced.	It’s	estimated	that	at	least	85	
percent	of	Mexican	workers	have	protection	contracts,	fake	contracts	
signed	by	corrupt	union	officials	to	exclude	genuine	unions	(Xelhuantzi	
López,	et	al.	2005,	151).	Of	the	remaining	15	percent,	most	are	members	of	
charro	unions,	corrupt,	authoritarian,	quasi‐corporatist,	government‐
linked	unions.	Thus	most	of	the	working	class	has	continued	to	lack	
organizations	through	which	to	build	effective	fight	backs	against	the	
relentless	neoliberal	assault	that	has	devastated	living	standards,	
workplace	health	and	safety,	and	workers’	rights	in	general.	
The	estimate	of	15	percent	is	based	on	non‐rural	workers	(private	
and	public),	excluding	those	in	small	familial	artisanal	shops.	The	rural	
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sector,	which	includes	only	15	percent	of	the	economically	active	
population,	only	has	a	unionization	rate	of	4	percent.	If	we	take	into	
account	the	whole	labour	force	of	the	country,	including	the	
proletarianized	or	semi‐proletarianized	rural	sectors	(including	mini‐
producers	and	ejidatarios,	who	often	also	work	as	seasonal	or	day	
labourers	within	Mexico	or	the	US),	the	rate	of	unionization	decreases	to	
11	percent,	which	would	give	Mexico	the	lowest	rate	of	unionization	of	the	
three	NAFTA	countries	(INEGI	2009).	
The	principal	consequence	of	the	corporate	offensive	has	been	the	
extreme	pauperization	of	workers	and	campesinos,	with	the	exception	of	
small	segments	that	preserved	some	elements	of	economic	well‐being	as	is	
the	case	with	the	oil	workers,	the	telephone	workers,	and	until	2009,	the	
power	workers	of	the	Light	and	Power	Company	of	the	Centre	(Luz	y	
Fuerza	del	Centro).	In	2009,	all	45,000	power	workers	were	fired	and	the	
company	liquidated.	But	for	the	immense	majority	of	workers	in	Mexico,	
the	profound	deterioration	of	the	purchasing	power	of	wages	is	a	
significant	and	defining	characteristic	under	the	new	capitalist	despotism.	
In	other	parts	of	Latin	America,	the	imposition	of	such	a	catastrophic	salary	
decline	was	only	possible	through	the	use	of	the	coercive	force	of	military	
coups	suffered	by	the	region	starting	with	the	military	coup	in	Brazil	in	
1964.	
	
Unemployment		
Neoliberal	policies	have	completely	failed	to	provide	new	formal	sector	
jobs	for	Mexico’s	rapidly	growing	labour	force.	Mexico	has	only	been	
creating	about	12	percent	of	the	new	jobs	needed	for	the	2	million	young	
people	entering	the	labour	market	each	year.	Only	2.2	million	new	jobs	
have	been	created	in	the	formal	sector	of	the	Mexico	economy	between	
2000	and	2010	while	20	million	people	have	joined	the	labour	market	
(IMSS	2010a).	These	figures	would	have	to	be	modified	by	taking	into	
account	the	opening	up	of	already	existing	jobs	through	retirement.	
Nevertheless,	the	job	deficit	is	enormous.	Neoliberal	policies,	by	opening	
the	economy	to	cheap	imports	and	removing	subsidies,	have	caused	a	
massive	loss	of	sources	of	livelihood	in	those	parts	of	the	rural	sector	that	
produce	for	the	domestic	market.	The	same	effects	have	been	felt	in	
industries	oriented	to	the	domestic	market.	But	these	losses	have	not	been	
offset	by	the	creation	of	new	jobs.	The	lack	of	significant	job	creation	
coupled	with	the	destruction	of	jobs	and	rural	livelihoods	has	fuelled	
massive	emigration	from	Mexico.	Mexico	is	a	gigantic	factory	for	producing	
pauperized	workers.	Every	day,	approximately	6,000	young	people	enter	a	
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labour	market	that	creates	only	slightly	more	than	700	spaces	daily.	The	
tremendous	number	of	undocumented	young	people	who	try	to	cross	the	
border	daily	are	only	a	small	portion	of	the	millions	of	dispossessed	youth	
whose	hopes	for	the	future	have	been	destroyed	by	the	neoliberal	project.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	informal	sector,	far	from	being	a	space	of	
self‐employed	workers,	marks	a	return	to	the	most	intense	forms	of	
exploitation	within	“small	establishments”:	in	1995,	the	number	of	wage	
earners	within	the	informal	sector	was	2.8	million	and	accounted	for	32	
percent	of	informal	employment.	By	2003,	wage	earners	in	the	informal	
sector	accounted	for	4.3	million	workers,	40	percent	of	those	working	in	
the	underground	economy,	those	companies	that	operate	without	any	
official	registration.	In	the	labour	market	as	a	whole,	formal	and	informal,	
27	million	workers	work	in	establishments	of	less	than	11	workers.	There	
are	600,000	“protection	contracts”	in	this	sector		of	small	workplaces.	Only	
three	percent	of	the	27	million	workers	in	small	establishments	are	
formally	unionized	(Xelhuantzi	López,	et	al.	2005,	40).	
The	present	crisis	has	had	a	devastating	impact	on	this	already	
vulnerable	labour	force,	of	which	approximately	two‐thirds,	or	32	million	
people,	remain	ensnared	in	the	informal	labour	market,	in	a	situation	of	
desperation	and	hopelessness,	and	only	one‐third,	17	million,	are	part	of	
the	formal	labour	market.	In	reality,	the	number	of	people,	that	exist	in	the	
interstices	of	the	economic	life	of	the	country,	without	even	gaining	a	
minimum	wage	(which,	at	present,	is	less	than	60	pesos	daily	or	less	than	
$5	US	daily),	has	reached	ten	million	people.	
There	has	been	renewed	job	growth	in	the	Mexican	economy	since	
the	crisis	of	2009	with	an	increase	of	714,000	jobs	in	the	formal	sector	
from	January	2009	to	January	2011.	However	64	percent	of	these	new	jobs	
are	at	the	lowest	end	of	the	pay	scale,	between	one	and	two	minimum	
salaries	(between	$5	and	$10	US	daily)	(IMSS	2010b).	The	transfer	of	jobs	
from	the	US	and	Canada	has	continued	through	the	crisis	but	at	rock‐
bottom	wage	levels.	Government	austerity	since	the	crisis	has	focused	on	
cutting	subsidies	to	gas	and	hydro	leading	to	price	increases	of	12	percent	
for	gas	and	15	percent	for	hydro	in	the	last	year.	These	price	increases	
have	contributed	to	the	high	general	inflation	of	wage	goods	in	Mexico.	
	
Towards a Fightback: Mexico and the Struggle for Workers’ Rights in North 
America  
The	Mexican	bourgeoisie	has	succeeded	in	defeating	and	dismantling	the	
economic	and	political	basis	of	power	of	the	old	party‐state	elites.	They	
have	also	succeeded	in	imposing	decades	of	austerity	on	the	Mexican	
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people.	But	they	have	not	been	able	to	consolidate	a	solid	historical	bloc,	a	
system	in	which	competition	and	conflict	could	be	contained	by	a	
hegemonic	consensus	among	the	key	political	and	economic	elites.	As	well,	
the	concurrent	neoliberal	assault	on	the	mass	of	the	population	has	
combined	with	the	on‐going	corruption	and	electoral	fraud	to	undermine	
attempts	at	legitimating	the	new	regime	to	the	mass	of	the	population.	
Mexico’s	organic	crisis,	simmering	in	the	last	decades	of	the	old	regime,	has	
come	close	to	boiling	over	several	times	in	the	post‐old	regime	period	
(since	2000)	as	in	the	anti‐electoral	fraud	protests	of	2006	and	in	the	
Oaxaca	uprising	that	same	year	(Roman	and	Velasco	2008).	
The	struggle	of	Mexican	workers	is	taking	place	in	this	context	of	an	
organic	crisis,	growing	militarization	and	repression,	the	continuation	of	
the	neoliberal	assault	on	popular	rights	and	wellbeing,	and	a	likely	
prolonged	economic	recession.	It	is	not	taking	place	in	a	context	of	a	
democratic	regime	or	an	actual	democratic	transition.	Though	Mexico’s	
“democratic	transition”	was	fuelled	by	the	democratic	aspirations	of	the	
middle	classes,	working	class,	and	popular	sectors,	it	has	been	largely	
captured	by	the	bourgeoisie	seeking	more	direct	control	of	the	Mexican	
state.	The	vast	majority	of	the	population	has	experienced	the	“democratic	
transition”	with	great	disappointment,	though	many	still	hope	to	push	it	
back	on	a	democratic	path.	But	they	face	political	and	economic	elites	who,	
in	spite	of	their	conflicts,	are	willing	to	use	ruthless	repression	against	any	
popular	challenges	to	their	power	and	privilege.	
The	working	class	movement	is	at	a	nadir	of	resistance.	The	on‐
going	state	repression	of	unions	(the	defeat	and	dismantling	of	the	SME,	
the	relentless	assault	on	the	miners’	union)	and	of	popular	movements	
(Atenco,	Oaxaca,	the	permanent	war	of	attrition	against	the	Zapatistas),	the	
continuing	state‐facilitated	thuggery	of	the	officials	of	major	unions	against	
their	own	members	(the	national	teachers	union	is	a	leading	example),	the	
job	losses	of	Mexican	workers	on	both	sides	of	the	border,	and	the	absence	
of	a	direction	of	struggle	that	seems	promising,	have	all	contributed	to	a	
demoralization	of	the	working	class	generally	and	of	working	class	
militants.	People	are	scrambling	to	survive	without	the	existence	of	
obvious	collective	ways	of	fighting	back.	
Nevertheless	there	are	significant	factors	that	point	to	the	
possibility	of	a	revival,	sooner	rather	than	later,	of	a	fight	back	on	the	part	
of	the	working	class.	Mexico’s	popular	revolutionary	tradition	lives	on	in	
both	working	class	and	in	peasant	and	indigenous	communities.	As	well,	
the	communalist	traditions	of	Mexico’s	peasants	and	indigenous	peoples	
have	migrated	along	with	these	peasants	and	indigenous	peoples	in	their	
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decades	of	proletarianization	and	urbanization.	These	traditions	survive	in	
urban	as	well	as	rural	areas	(which	now	contain	less	than	25	percent	of	the	
population).	
If	these	powerful	and	widely	spread	residues	of	revolutionary	
tradition	and	communalist	sensibility	have	a	wide	presence	in	the	popular	
classes,	the	relentless	character	of	Mexico’s	neoliberal	capitalist	offensive	
will	increasingly	compel	people	to	seek	collective	solutions.	The	hopes	for	
better	jobs,	more	rights,	and	a	more	civil	country	raised	by	the	decades	of	
struggle	for	a	democratic	transition,	by	the	false	promises	of	NAFTA	
making	Mexico	a	first‐world	country,	by	the	replacement	of	the	one‐party	
regime	in	the	presidential	elections	of	2000,	have	been	demolished	by	the	
realities	of	the	relentless	neoliberal	assault	and	the	new	austerity	being	
imposed	on	the	popular	classes	by	the	regime.	A	large	majority	of	Mexico’s	
population	lives	in	extreme	poverty;	many	are	being	pushed	over	the	edge	
of	survival	by	the	recent	crisis	which,	in	Mexico,	has	been	combined	with	
rising	food	and	utility	prices.	The	US	economic	crisis	has	both	closed	the	
safety	valve	of	the	US	labour	market	for	“surplus”	Mexican	workers	and	
dramatically	reduced	remittances	to	Mexico,	a	key	source	of	survival	for	
many	families	and	communities.	There	are	no	indications	of	an	economic	
revival	on	the	horizon	as	Mexico’s	dependence	on	the	US	economy	
guarantees	that	Mexico’s	recovery	will	be	as	slow	as	that	of	the	US.	The	
government	of	Mexico	is	carrying	out	austerity	programs	that	will	both	
make	life	harsher	for	workers	and	the	poor	and	make	a	recovery	more	
difficult.	
The	new	Mexican	workers’	movement	cannot	develop	on	the	basis	
of	trade	unionism	alone.	Workers	will	continue	to	face	severe	and	brutal	
repression	by	the	state,	private	capital,	and	charros.	The	new	movement	
will	have	to	challenge	the	very	framework	and	institutions	of	repression.	
Union	and	workers’	rights	can	only	achieve	any	durability	in	a	transformed	
institutional	framework.	The	fight	for	reformist	goals	and	democratic	
demands	(right	of	association,	civil	liberties,	etc.)	have	to	be	blended	with	
strategies	in	which	workers	prepare	themselves	ideologically	and	
organizationally	for	a	transformational	struggle.	
The	struggle	of	Mexican	workers	has	powerful	continental	
dimensions.	Mexico	is	part	of	NAFTA	along	with	its	two	northern	
neighbours.	US	and	Canadian	companies,	especially	auto	and	auto	parts,	
have	major	investments	in	Mexico.	And	the	Mexican	working	class	has	a	
powerful	presence	in	the	US	labour	force.	Around	one‐fifth	of	the	Mexican	
working	class	works	in	the	US	and	Mexicans	make	up	the	largest	segment	
of	the	immigrant	section	of	the	US	working	class.	This	means	that	events	in	
ROMAN	and	ARREGUI:	The	Fragile	Rise	of	Bourgeois	Hegemony	
 
257 
the	Mexican	class	struggle	will	resound	powerfully	in	the	US	(with	echoes	
in	Canada).	
Worker’s	insurgency	in	Mexico	will	immediately	trigger	hostile	
responses	from	US	and	Canadian	capital	as	well	as	their	governments.	
Mexican	workers	will	need	solidarity	from	the	North	to	oppose	open	or	
disguised	military	intervention,	an	intervention	whose	foundations	have	
been	set	already	with	Plan	Mexico	(security	and	military	cooperation	
agreement	between	the	US	and	Mexico).	But	beyond	this	essential	anti‐
interventionist	solidarity,	there	needs	to	develop	a	strategy	of	common	
struggles	over	related	though	not	identical	demands	around	social	justice,	
workers’	rights,	and	genuine	democracy.	
Continental	integration	of	North	America,	especially	through	
NAFTA,	has	afforded	US	and	Canadian,	as	well	as	Mexican,	capital	powerful	
levers	for	downward	pressures	on	the	whole	North	American	working	
class,	including	the	Mexican.	But	it	has	also	added	an	explosive	ingredient	
to	the	North	American	panorama	of	class	struggle:	a	young,	super‐
exploited	working	class	with	old	revolutionary	and	communalist	traditions	
in	a	ruthless	regime	in	deep	and	multiple	crises.	When	Mexico’s	working	
class	jaguar	rises,	the	roar	will	resonate	deep	into	the	North.	
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